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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The appellant Abdelaziz Aboelseud ("Mr. Aboelseud") was never served properly 
or otherwise, with a certified copy of the protective order he is accused of having 
violated. In addition, the State's assertion of legislative intent ignores the basic principles 
of statutory construction, and the plain language of the applicable statute. Furthermore, 
Mr. Aboelseud's initiation of and appearance at the protective order proceedings does not 
constitute a waiver of the statutory requirement that he be served with a certified copy of 
the protective order. Simply stated, the State has failed to prove an essential element of 
the alleged offense. 
The trial court's judgment must also be reversed because Mr. Aboelseud sought 
only to communicate with the parents of Stephana Garcia ("Ms. Garcia"), 
communications which were not prohibited by the protective order. In any event. Ms. 
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Garcia consented to the communications which the State claims violated the protective 
order. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. ABOELSEUD WAS NEVER PROPERLY SERVED WITH A 
CERTIFIED COPY OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDER. THUS, THE 
STATE FAILED TO PROVE AN ELEMENT OF THE ALLEGED 
OFFENSE AND, THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
MUST BE REVERSED. 
As a threshold matter. Mr. Aboelseud notes that the State failed to adduce any 
evidence at trial that Mr. Aboelseud ever received a certified copy, or any other copy of 
the protective order at issue.1 Thus, the State failed to meet is burden of demonstrating an 
essential element of the alleged offense — that Mr. Aboelseud violated the protective 
order after having been "properly served with i t . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108. 
In opposing Mr. Aboelseud's appeal, the State argues it met its burden of proving 
that Mr. Aboelseud was "properly served" (Utah Code Ann. §76-5-108) with a certified 
copy of the protective order "in accordance with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure" (Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-5(5)(a)), by demonstrating that Mr. Aboelseud 
initiated the protective order proceedings, and was present at the hearing on his petition 
for a protective order. See Brief of Appellee at 10-12. In so arguing, the State ignores the 
relevant principles of statutory construction and the fundamental elements necessary to 
establish a waiver. 
^ e only "evidence" adduced at trial with respect to whether Mr. Aboelseud ever received a copy 
of the protective order was in the way oral argument immediately prior to trial where it was discussed that 
the attorney who represented Mr. Aboelseud in the protective order proceedings, as opposed to Mr 
Aboelseud, had received a copy of the protective order. There was never any evidence presented with 
respect to whether Mr. Aboelseud ever received a copy of the protective order. 
2 
A. The State's Assertion Of Legislative Intent Ignores The 
Basic Principles Of Statutory Construction. 
The State asserts that legislative intent supports a finding that "proper service" of 
a protective order can be accomplished through some means other than that mancaied by 
the statute — i.e., "in accordance with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-6-5(5)(a). However, the State ignores the basic principles of stamtory 
construction. 
When construing a statute, a court's "primary responsibility . . . is to give effect to 
the legislature's underlying intent." Savage Industries v. Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 5-^ . 671 
(Utah 1991). To the end, statutes are construed according to the plain meaning of the 
language used, and each word is presumed to be used advisedly by the legislature. Id. at 
670; see also Chris & Dick's Lumber & Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511. 514 
(Utah 1990). Thus, "statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable." Savage Industries, 811 P.2d at 670. 
Here, there is no question, and even the State concedes, that the only type of 
service which constitutes "proper service" for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 is 
service which is made "in accordance with Rule 4 of the Utah Rule of Civil Procecure[.]" 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-5(5)(a). Such service is, clearly, the type of service contemplated 
and mandated by the legislature when it passed the version of Utah Code Ann. 30-6-
5(5)(a) at issue on this appeal. 
As set forth in Mr. Aboelseud's opening brief, Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is clear that in order to effect service upon an individual, service must be made 
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by delivering a copy of the [document being served] to the individually 
personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling or usual place 
of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing, or 
be delivering a copy of the [document being served] to an agent authorized 
by appointment or by law to receive service of process[.] 
Utah R. Civ. P. 4 (e)(1). Yet here, the State conceded that a certified copy of the 
protective order was never formally served — i.e. by a process server, upon Mr. 
Aboelseud. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that a certified copy was ever 
served on any individual who was "an agent authorized" by Mr. Aboelseud to receive 
service. The service requirements of Rule 4 were clearly never met and, therefore, the 
trial court's judgment must be reversed. Moreover, to interpret Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-
5(5)(a) in the manner suggested by the State would result in the statute being 
unconstitutional as applied, in that Mr. Aboelseud did not have prior notice that the 
statute meant something other than what is contained within the language of the s^rate 
itself. 
B. Mr. Aboelseud's Initiation Of And Appearance At The 
Protective Order Proceedings Does Not Constitute A 
Waiver Of The Statutory Requirement Of Proper 
Service With A Certified Copy Of The Protective 
Order. 
In order to avoid its failure to adduce any evidence at trial which could er^blish 
that Mr. Aboelseud ever received a copy of the protective order, the State asserts that Mr. 
Aboelseud waived the statutorily mandated requirement that he be "properly served" with 
a certified copy of the protective order "in accordance with Rule 4 of the Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure" by initiating the protective order proceedings and by appearing at the 
hearing on the petition for protective order. Although the State is correct in assening that 
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an individual can in fact waive the formal service requirements of Rule 4,2 no such waiver 
occurred in this case. On the contrary, the only logical and reasonable inference which 
can be drawn from the fact that Ms. Garcia executed a waiver of service of process, but 
that Mr. Aboelseud did not, is that Mr. Aboelseud did not waive the formal service 
requirements of Rule 4. Moreover, the State's argument of waiver ignores the 
fundamental elements necessary to establish a waiver. 
As set forth in Mr. Aboelseud's opening brief, Utah law is clear that in order to 
create a valid waiver, there must have been "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of 
a known right." Beckstead v. Deseret Roofing Co,, 831 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) (quoting Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Here, 
there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Aboelseud ever knowingly and intentionally 
waived his right to be served, in accordance with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, with a certified copy of the protective order. On the contrary, the only person 
who made such a waiver in this case was Ms. Garcia, who executed a waiver of service of 
process. Mr. Aboelseud did not execute any such waiver, and there is no evidence to 
suggest he ever intended to effect such a waiver simply by seeking a protective order on 
his own behalf. 
2For example, Ms. Stephana Garcia, the person who accused Mr. Aboelseud of violating the 
protective order, who was the subject of the mutual protective order in question, and who also attended the 
hearing on the petition for protecm e order, executed a formal acceptance of service of process, whereby 
she waived the formal service requirements of Rule 4. See, e.g., Transcript of Trial at 6:17-24. A copy of 
the transcript is attached as an Addendum to the Brief of Appellee. On the other hand, Mr. Aboelseud 
never executed any such waiver. 
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Apparently recognizing its inability to point the Court to any evidence of a 
"voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right[,j" (Beckstead, 831 P.2d at 
132), the State refers the Court to three cases which are completely inapposite. See. e.g., 
Brief of Appellee at 12 (citing the Court to Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp, 
545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976); Cline v. City of Boulder, 450 P.2d 335 (Colo. 1969); and 
{Montano v. Scottsdale Baptist Hosp., 581 P.2d 682 (Ariz. 1978)). Of particular 
importance is that none of these three cases involve criminal actions. 
Furthermore, the issue in Downey — whether a party can submit itself to a court's 
jurisdiction by appearing before the court and seeking affirmative relief, is not the issue 
presented in this appeal. Rather, the issue here is whether Mr. Aboelseud can be held 
criminally liable for violating a protective order where he was never served, properly or 
otherwise, with a copy of the protective as is mandated by the applicable sections of the 
Utah Code. Such issue is dramatically different from the issue of whether the coun in the 
protective order proceedings had jurisdiction over Mr. Aboelseud, a jurisdictional 
question which Mr. Aboelseud does not contest and which is not at issue here. 
Similarly, the issues presented in the Cline and Montano cases are dramatically 
different from the issue presented here. In both Cline and Montano the issue was whether 
a party waives service of process by appearing in a civil action where no proper service of 
process has occurred. In both cases the courts held that such appearance in fact cures the 
previously existing lack of service. See Cline, 450 P.2d at 337; Montano, 581 P.2d at 
686. The reason for such a holding is clear — the appearance in the civil action occurred 
after the lack of service already existed. Thus, the appearance in the civil actions were 
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deemed to have cured an already existing defect in service. No such circumstance exists 
here. On the contrary, the service of the protective order which is at issue was required to 
occur after the hearing on the petition for protective order. There simply was no 
preexisting lack of service that existed or that could have been cured simply by virtue of 
Mr. Aboelseud's appearance at the protective order hearing. The case relied on by the 
State involve issue which are significantly different from the issue present in this appeal 
and are not applicable. 
C. The State Improperly Cites The Court To An 
Unpublished Decision From Minnesota, While Ignoring 
Relevant Authority Which Is Published. 
Rule 4-508, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, expressly provides that 
[ujnpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential value 
and shall not be cited or used in the courts of this state, except for 
purposes of applying the doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or 
collateral estoppel. 
Despite the clear mandate of Rule 4-508, on page 11 of its brief, the State cites this Court 
to the unpublished decision of State of Minnesota v. Dumas, No. CX-93-1608 (Minn. Ct. 
App., March 8, 1994) (available on Westlaw, 1994 WL 71403). The State's reliance on, 
and citation of, the unpublished Dumas is improper and should not be countenanced. 
In any event, the Dumas opinion is not relevant and is of no assistance to the 
State. As in the instant case, the Minnesota domestic abuse statute requires that a copy of 
the protective order be served, via personal service, upon the person against whom the 
protective order is issued. However, unlike the Utah criminal statute at issue here, the 
Minnesota statute provides that a person may be held criminally liable for violation of a 
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protective order where "the respondent or person to be restrained knows of the order[.]" 
Dumas, 1994 WL 71403 at *2 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(a) (1992)). 
Accordingly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a failure to effect proper personal 
service could not preclude criminal liability for violation of the protective order where the 
person charged with the offense had actual knowledge of the protective order. Such 
ruling is simply not applicable here, however, because the Utah statute does not provide 
criminal liability where the person charged has knowledge of the protective order. 
Rather, Utah law provides for criminal liability only where the alleged violation occurs 
after the protective order has been "properly served[.]fl 
Although the Dumas case is not relevant, other authority from Utah's sister states 
is relevant to the issue presented here. For example, in State of Hawaii v. Medina. 824 
P.2d 106 (Haw. 1992), the Hawaii Supreme Court was presented with an appeal by the 
State of a dismissal of a charge of violation of a protective order. There, as here, there 
was no dispute that the defendant had knowledge of the protective order. However. 
because the defendant was never personally served with the protective order, as mandated 
by Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586-6. the trial court dismissed the charge. On appeal, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court affirmed, stating: 
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, that language must 
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive unless literal application would 
produce an absurd or unjust result clearly inconsistent with the purposes 
and policies of the statute. The plain wording of HRS § 586-6 requires 
personal service of an order. The only stated exception is where the 
respondent is present at the hearing at which the order issues, in which 
case the order may be mailed. In all other cases we believe that the 
personal service requirement eliminates any chance of misunderstanding 
or confusion by providing assurance that a defendant prosecuted under 
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HRS § 586-11 has received a written copy of the order, and therefore, 
knows the exact content of the order. 
Medina, 824 P.2d at 107 (emphasis added and citations omitted). 
The Medina opinion is directly relevant here, where even the State acknowledges 
that Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 mandates that Mr. Aboelseud have been "properly 
served" with the protective order. Furthermore, unlike Medina, the Utah statutes provide 
no exception to the personal service rule for circumstances where the defendant was 
present at the hearing on the protective order. The State's attempt to read such an 
exception in to the Utah statute, as well as the State's attempt to read in an exception 
based on knowledge of the existence of a protective order, must be rejected. Such 
exceptions do not appear in the statute, and cannot be supported by the well-accepted 
principles which govern statutory construction. 
II. OTHER GROUNDS ALSO EXIST FOR REVERSAL OF THE 
TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT. 
The State concedes that the protective order did not prohibit Mr. Aboelseud from 
contacting Ms. Garcia's parents. Yet the record is clear that the sole purpose for Mr. 
Aboelseud's telephone calls to the Garcia residence was to speak with Ms. Garcia's 
parents. Accordingly, the trial court's finding of a violation of the protective order is 
erroneous and violates Mr. Aboelseud's rights to due process. 
The State also concedes that Ms. Garcia picked up the telephone knowing the Mr. 
Aboelseud was the person on the other end. Such conduct evidences consent and waiver 
by Ms. Garcia, and necessitates a reversal of the trial court's judgment. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment against Abdelaziz Aboelseud 
should be reversed, and the charge against him should be dismissed with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED this 26th day of February, 1996. 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Ronald F. Price 
Attorneys for Abdelaziz Aboelseud 
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